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Introduction  
 
Cosmopolitanism concerns distances in multiple and diverse ways. In the most literal 
sense, cosmopolitanism is typically understood by many thinkers as the annihilation 
of distance or the compression of space and time that brings closer different people 
and cultures. However, this effaces the distance that ought to separate 
cosmopolitanism from globalization1
                                                          
1 I argue out this point in Marianna Papastephanou, Thinking Differently About Cosmopolitanism: 
Theory, Eccentricity and the Globalized World (Boulder: Paradigm, 2012).  
 as an empirical phenomenon (in some respects 
in process and in other respects accomplished) of rootlessness, unobstructed contact 
and global mobility. In a more figurative sense, cosmopolitanism evokes the covering 
of the distance that separates the moral self from the ever broadening concentric 
circles that surround the “I”. Some theorists cross the distance between the literal 
sense of cosmopolitanism (being mobile, covering long distances, learning about 
otherness) and the figurative sense (transcending the moral borders that block 
people’s rapprochement regardless of actual encounter and contact among them). 
Thus, they assume an easy passage from cosmopolitan exposure (or enjoyment of 
diversity and eagerness to know about the world) to showing respect, even concern, 
for strangers. The cosmopolitan self is expected to treat the others even of the outer 
circles up to the whole humanity as s/he would treat the near and dear.  
Many debates, especially in liberal and communitarian circles, have revolved around 
the extent to which the distance between the self and strangers is negotiable or 
manageable. But most approaches converge on the unchallenged centrality they 
bestow upon the self. Even the geometrical trope of concentric circles attests to the 
placement of the self centre-stage. To this centrality of subjectivity, I argue, another 
geometrical metaphor might be an appropriate response: cosmopolitanism can be 
illustrated through the image of eccentric circles. The decentration of the subject 
through ec-centricity neither effaces the self nor discards the concentric circles. It 
aims rather to enrich the cosmopolitan perspective with ever shifting circles where the 
centre is often the other, the other who invites us not quite to shrink our distance from 
her but rather to create a distance from what appears to be our own, what pertains to 
our self, what comprises, for instance, our consolidated practices, perceptions, 
interpretations and actions that affect otherness.  
Here I will not say more about ec-centric cosmopolitanism generally.2
                                                          
2 For more, see Papastephanou, Thinking Differently About Cosmopolitanism. 
 I will rather try 
to instantiate it with an example of what I see as a necessary de-centration of the self. 
I suggest that, at the level of self-understanding and self-description, there should be a 
distance between the self and the attribute ‘cosmopolitan’. Thus, contra Jeremy 
Waldron’s views in his relevant article3 that a cultural-political task of today is to 
describe and embody the cosmopolitan rather than cosmopolitanism, my aim4
A Critique of the ‘Cosmopolitan’     
 here is 
to question the facile attribution of cosmopolitanism to selfhood. To this end, I 
discuss the self-bestowed liberal claim ‘I am a cosmopolitan’. I argue that the 
declarative element in this self-description obscures the possibility of extracting 
important ethico-political insights from the distance that might separate the self from 
cosmopolitanism as a supposedly accomplished ideal of selfhood. To illustrate my 
objections and also to point to another theoretical framing of the desirable distance 
between the self and the attribute ‘cosmopolitan’ I shall employ a dictum by 
Democritus.     
Recent criticisms directed at the self-understanding of the ‘cosmopolitan’ have been 
formulated by David Hansen. Hansen refers to the problematic self-referential 
element of cosmopolitan discourse as follows. ‘There is something amiss, awkward, 
and untrue to experience for a person to claim, “I am a cosmopolitan”, or to say about 
his or her community, “We are cosmopolitan”’.5
                                                          
3 Jeremy Waldron, “What Is Cosmopolitan?” The Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2) (2000): 227-
243. 
 The declarative modality invokes a 
supposed actuality of cosmopolitan identity, since the latter is proclaimed an 
accomplished task. But, as Hansen explains, ‘a cosmopolitan sensibility is not a 
possession, badge, or settled accomplishment. It is an orientation that depends 
4 This aim reflects a theoretical endeavour that comprises other texts too. See, for instance, Marianna 
Papastephanou, “The 'Cosmopolitan' Self Does her Homework,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 
45 (4) (2011): 597-612. 
5 David Hansen, “Education Viewed Through a Cosmopolitan Prism” Philosophy of Education 
Yearbook (2008): 206-214, 213. 
fundamentally upon the ongoing quality of one´s interactions with others, with the 
world, and with one´s own self’.6
In my view, we may avoid the objection that Hansen has raised by shifting our 
perspective from the contemporary emphasis on the self-declarative element in 
cosmopolitan subjectivity to a third-person depiction of the cosmopolitan self through 
the qualifications of wisdom and goodness. As it becomes clear later on, I draw a 
relevant formulation from a source that is more ancient than the Diogenic declaration 
of his being a ‘citizen of the world’: I see in one of Democritus’s dicta a way out of 
the centripetal implications that accompany the uses to which the Diogenic 
declaration has been put. 
  
Against some abstract, disembodied accounts of cosmopolitanism, some theorists 
concretize the cosmopolitan self as the embodied world traveler. More than just 
cultural dispositions, the ‘cosmopolitan characteristics of flexibility, adaptability and 
openness to difference and risk’ are ‘embodied performances of fitness and fitting in. 
Travellers literally embody cosmopolitanism’.7 However, especially within this more 
practice- and context- oriented approach the initial and minimal core assumption of 
the footloose burgher as the self-declared cosmopolitan remains stronger than ever. 
Thus, the basic assumption underlying such ideas is that ‘cosmopolitanism, at the very 
least, is a way of relating to the world’.8
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
 But, who relates cosmopolitically to the 
world and how? The typical answer reflects, in my view, a Cartesian solipsist starting 
point: the self who takes himself to be a citizen of the world. Consider the following 
citation, for instance: ‘from the Greek stoics, through the Medieval Christians with 
         7 J. Germann-Molz, “Cosmopolitan Bodies: Fit to Travel and Travelling to Fit” Body and Society 12 
(3), (2006): 1-21, 17. 
8 E. Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism” Ethics and Global Politics 2 (3) 
(2009): 241-258, 242. 
their universalistic Gospel, through the Byzantine Empire, to the Enlightenment 
philosophes, to be cosmopolitan was to think oneself citizen of the entire world’.9 The 
thinking subject considers herself a citizen of cosmos with no concern about any 
possible distance of the actual self from such an ideality. In simpler words, the self 
attributes to herself a cosmopolitan citizenship exclusively on grounds of how she 
thinks about her own self, without fathoming this symbolic citizenship in terms of 
how others receive the self-image that she maintains or are affected by the actions and 
performances of the self-declared ‘cosmopolitan’ I. Within such frameworks, most 
accounts of the cosmopolitan take it to portray ‘the lifestyle of a globally conscious 
person, a cultivated citizen of the world’.10
The description of oneself as cosmopolitan becomes more explicit when 
contemporary theorists join debates. Most interesting are cases where thinkers take 
offense by criticisms that surface in such debates and respond to charges. Such cases 
reveal identifications most tellingly. Waldron’s taking offence at Roger Scruton’s 
calling cosmopolitans ‘parasites’ is a case in point, one that I have discussed 
extensively elsewhere.
  
11
                                                          
9 Ibid, my emphasis. 
 Suffice it here to say that Waldron writes that he feels the 
‘sting in the tail’ as a cosmopolitan himself when Scruton characterizes the 
cosmopolitan ‘a parasite’. Waldron’s venture to offer a self-description of the 
cosmopolitan is then pictured precisely as a defence of the cosmopolitan against the 
charge of parasitism. To similar charges of parasitism, A. K. Appiah also responds 
through identification with the group that is thus targeted: ‘We cosmopolitans face a 
familiar litany of objections. Some, for example, have complained that our 
         10 Torill Strand, “The Making of a New Cosmopolitanism”, Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 
(2010): 229-242, 231. 
11 Papastephanou, Thinking Differently About Cosmopolitanism. 
cosmopolitanism must be parasitic’.12
Thus viewed, cosmopolitan selfhood is no longer an un-finished task, an open 
question, an ideal that is ever receding yet always desirable and inviting of 
approximation. It is rather an accomplished reality, an effected and realized subjective 
utopia. Then again, one may point out that, although presupposing the cosmopolitans’ 
epistemic universalism, Appiah nevertheless qualifies it with openness and 
inconclusiveness. Against ‘counter-cosmopolitans’ (in Appiah’s terms, those 
fundamentalist universalists who believe that their truth should be universally 
endorsed or even enforced), Appiah retorts: ‘we cosmopolitans believe in universal 
truth, too, though we are less certain that we have it all already’.
 Despite merits of both approaches, namely, 
Waldron’s and Appiah’s (which are very diverse, nevertheless, regardless of their 
being placed together here), within them, an easy passage from the pleasure-seeking 
subject to the moral subject who shows respect for diversity is coupled with a view of 
cosmopolitans as a quasi-community. This community is determined by a ‘we’, i.e. by 
an accomplished collective subjectivity that declares its presence, contests and 
demarcates its own discursive space and defends itself against charges by other 
camps. 
13 Further, once again 
affirming the first person plural of the cosmopolitan collectivity and its self-
understanding, Appiah writes that ‘we cosmopolitans think we might learn something 
even from those we disagree with’.14
                                                          
12 K. A. Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots”, Critical Inquiry, 23 (3) (1997): 617-639, 618, emph mine. 
 Such formulations surely mitigate the 
impression of completeness of the self-bestowed attribute ‘cosmopolitan’; however, 
they still depict a self prepared to benefit cognitively from otherness (what about re-
 
13 K. A. Appiah, ‘Education for Global Citizenship’ In D. Coulter and J. Wiens, (eds.), Why Do We 
Educate? Renewing the Conversation (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2008): 83-99, 95, emph mine.   
14 Ibid, 97, emph mine. 
directing her/his ethico-political priorities, e.g. historical pending debts?) and, at the 
same time, a self who is ready to parade this qualification as yet another badge, an 
accomplishment that differentiates the cosmopolitans from all others and bestows 
upon them a sense of moral and epistemic superiority. 
The time-honoured phenomenology of a ‘subject-object’ cosmopolitanism obfuscates 
a point that E. Mendieta makes (in a different context and for different reasons) as 
follows: ‘we are always more and less than what we are imagined to be, which is why 
we must allow others to challenge our ‘images’ and ‘imagination’ of them, and 
conversely, to allow ourselves to correct our own self-understanding in light of those 
challenges’.15
What about a more dialogical model of approaching cosmopolitan self-declaration? 
Does it overcome the problems of the subject-object model of the self relating to the 
world? I think not (or not always) and I examine this possibility by reference to Bruce 
Ackerman. Ackerman discusses cosmopolitanism as universalist agreement on certain 
values, and rightly perceives its dangers. But, in a confessional tone, he declares 
himself a cosmopolitan as follows: ‘I remain an unrepentant cosmopolitan. But there 
are risks lurking in this existential stance – a clear and present danger of 
pretentiousness, preciocity, and solipsism, as I find that others refuse to engage on the 
terms that ego finds so reasonable’.
 However, although much contemporary cosmopolitanism embraces, in 
theory, the above statement, it pays only lip service to it, in reality. For it lets its 
commitment to such openness be toned down by the ‘subject-object’ conceptual 
premises that ground what counts as cosmopolitan. 
16
                                                          
15 E. Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism”, 254. 
 How do I, the rootless self, whose identity is 
cosmopolitan, cope with the radical difference of the rooted others, those who do not 
16 B. Ackerman, ‘Rooted Cosmopolitanism’, Ethics, 104 (3) (1994): 516–535, 535. 
share what I find so reasonable? How do I cope with those others (counter-
cosmopolitans, if we recall Appiah’s term) who enter dialogue with the view that they 
already possess the universal truth whereas I (as Appiah has also asserted) am open 
enough to assume that I may not possess it and, therefore, I may learn it from others 
(though surely not from troublesome others whom I only need to learn how to handle 
or how to cope with)? Once again we have here a rationale of self-declared 
cosmopolitanism where the self is put centre stage in the privileged moral position of 
being the one who has to cope with others’ absolutizing solipsistically their own 
standpoint or the one who fears the cosmopolitan failures of others.   
 
Before Diogenes  
 
Already in antiquity (and before Diogenes’s famous statement ‘I am a citizen of the 
world’), Socrates had declared his belonging to the world rather than exclusively to 
the city. With an eye to the Socratic ideal of an examined life, Martha Nussbaum has 
connected education for citizenship with three capacities, the third of which is to see 
oneself as a cosmopolitan.17 Seeing oneself as a cosmopolitan is crucial for Nussbaum 
as her employment of the Diogenic declaration (I am a kosmou politis) as a motto in 
her acclaimed essay on patriotism and cosmopolitanism attests.18
                                                          
17 M. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 9-11. 
 However, unlike 
some theorists who associate the cosmopolitan with a rather undemanding self-image 
(politically and ethically), at least Nussbaum does not give to the idea of ‘seeing 
18 M. Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, in For Love of Country? eds. M. Nussbaum and J. 
Cohen, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 2. It has to be said that, as her 2002 introduction to the 
corresponding edition of For Love of Country shows, Nussbaum is well aware of the risks 
involved in any complacent ‘we’ (perhaps more aware than many of her critics), be it the ‘we’ of 
compatriots threatened and alarmed by new realities or, by extension, that of more globally 
sensitive versions of any particular collectivity up to the most encompassing collectivity itself. 
 
oneself as cosmopolitan’ a primarily travelling and cultural-touristic sense. Drawing 
on Stoic themes, she emphasizes, rather, the moral obligations that should go hand in 
hand with the cosmopolitan self-image. Thus, despite the fact that Nussbaum’s 
emphasis on the capacity to see oneself as cosmopolitan maintains some of the 
problems of the declarative self-description, it has to be acknowledged that her 
cosmopolitanism makes some demands upon the self. Likewise, it would be unfair to 
take Diogenes’s declaration of himself as a citizen of the world out of its context and 
of its performative operations. Be that as it may, there is indeed something self-
congratulatory in inviting people to be ‘cosmopolitans as we are’. Thus, the question 
is: can we approach the adjective ‘cosmopolitan’ in a more de-centred or ec-centric 
way, can we salvage it from the self-indulgent tone or from the ‘subject-object’ 
relation?  
The answer I give presupposes a critique of the monological framework in which 
cosmopolitanism is couched. Monologism posits the individual in the centre of 
relations. The self draws the ever expanding circles closer to her and thus remains the 
main reference point of cosmopolitanism.19
                                                          
19 Zelia Gregoriou raises similar objections to such operations of concentric cosmopolitanism, though 
from a different standpoint. Z. Gregoriou, ‘Resisting the Pedagogical Domestication of 
Cosmopolitanism: From Nussbaum’s Concentric Circles of Humanity to Derrida’s Aporetic Ethics of Hospitality’ Philosophy of Education Yearbook (2003): 257-266. 
 Instead of worrying about how we, as 
incarnations of the ideal cosmopolitan self-description, will cope with ‘counter-
cosmopolitans’; instead of worrying about how to cover the supposed distance that 
separates us from them or from other ‘others’; it is perhaps more advisable to turn to 
the distance that separates any embodied cosmopolitanism from the ever receding 
cosmopolitan ideal. Facing instead of effacing or ignoring such a distance leads us to 
 
test our cosmopolitanism on grounds of how we act in ways that affect, view or treat 
otherness (human and non-human).  
Hence, let us look for something more minimal (but, simultaneously, ethico-
politically maximal) about the human self than contemporary self-declarative 
approaches to being cosmopolitan. Diogenes’s declaration, interpreted by Nussbaum 
as an invitation to people to see themselves as citizens of the world rather than of the 
polis, can also be construed as a plea to join him in a citizenship out of his world; in 
other words, to join him in recognizing that the cosmopolitan citizen is a utopian 
citizen, a citizen of a world to come, a world that should come, or, better, a world that 
should be brought to existence by those who would aspire to be its citizens, yet they 
are not. As indicated just above, we need something ec-centric that, instead of placing 
us in the world (as it currently is), displaces us and commit us to images that are out 
of this world; something relatively disconnected from the first person (singular or 
plural: ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘myself’, ‘ourselves’) and, at the same time, more outspoken about 
the kinds of thought and action that can guide people as preconditions of 
cosmopolitanism. However, Diogenes’s self-proclamation is inextricable from the 
performative purposes of the time of its enunciation, and it is a self-proclamation after 
all.   
Going even further back in time we find a third-person ideal description of the 
cosmopolitan that was given by a philosopher older than the Cynic Diogenes. 
Democritus (b. 460 BC) had stated roughly 50 years before Diogenes that ‘any land is 
traversible by the wise; to the good self the whole world is homeland’ (frg 247, 
emphasis mine).20
Conclusion 
 Traversing space and covering distances is a possibility assumed in 
this dictum as much as in current accounts of cosmopolitanism; what makes the 
difference from those, however, is the distance from the self that the third person 
introduces and also that traversibility is qualified by intellectual and ethical 
preconditions: wisdom and goodness respectively.  
The distance between the real and the ideal (that I am not, but I would like to be) as 
well as between the I (we) and the Other that the third-person description of the wise 
and the good inserts staves off the risk of cosmopolitanism as self-proclamation. 
Therefore, it illustrates the de-centering process of an ec-centric cosmopolitanism as a 
diversion from the self-centeredness of the contemporary globalized self and from the 
self-indulgent, soothing self-image of the self-declared cosmopolitan. It also keeps 
away associations of accomplishment because it sets demands on selfhood such as 
wisdom and goodness which, thankfully, the Western, ‘cosmopolitanized’ world still 
regards as daunting (or, at least, shies away from claiming that it meets them already). 
Although citizens of the globalized world often raise claims to cosmopolitan selfhood, 
seldom do they feel comfortable with claims of having achieved the status of the wise 
and the good. They would not declare ‘we, the wise and good’ with the same ease that 
they declare ‘we, cosmopolitans’. 
Wisdom and goodness and the awe they inspire supply the missing link with action. 
For, the passage to action is really absent in the received view on cosmopolitanism: 
                                                          
20 [In the Greek original: andri sophō pasa gē vati; Psychēs gar agathēs patris o xymbas cosmos].The 
phrase is also mentioned by R. Schlaifer, (1936). “Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle” 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 47 (1936): 165-204, 169. 
the emphasis on never-ending, formative dialogue does not specify what the self-
declared ‘cosmopolitans’ deem wise and ethical to do in a world that celebrates, yet, 
arguably, pays lip service to, diversity. The ‘cosmopolitanized’ world indulges itself 
in the positive moral self-image that the proclamation of cosmopolitan commitment 
bestows upon the person. However, at the same time, the supposedly cosmopolitan 
citizens accept with too few questions the unethical role of their governments in 
various conflicts, the ongoing destruction of the environment and the failure to take 
the appropriate measures, as well as the letting of people die of hunger, lack of water 
and medication in many places around the world. Against this situation, wisdom and 
goodness raise expectations of thought and action that unsettle the convenient 
conception of the cosmopolitan as the person who, rooted or rootless, enriches herself 
with cultural material from diverse localities and shows the appropriate respect to 
such diverse providers of existential options and of marketplaces of goods, ideas and 
lifestyles.   
Likewise, the elitism that is usually associated with the graduate, the academic, the 
traveler as such (or the footloose manager) can be challenged by the fact that neither 
wisdom nor goodness is inextricably tied with the Eurocentric notion of the educated 
and well-fed burgher. Apparently paradoxically, the cognitive and affective 
significance of learning about the other can often be grasped and then expressed by 
people who have developed a self-less and inquisitive personality regardless of ability 
or inability to ‘prove’ their cosmopolitanism by means of degrees, journeys and other 
such tokens of mobility and encyclopedic knowledgeability. Furthermore, the 
inconclusive character of the ideals of wisdom and goodness can be transferred to the 
ideal of being cosmopolitan and make the latter’s inconclusiveness stand out too. 
   
